

INTERNAL COLONY OR INTERNAL PERIPHERY? A CRITIQUE OF CURRENT MODELS AND AN ALTERNATIVE FORMULATION

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In the course of the 1960's, Appalachia was rediscovered as a social problem region. Efforts of mainstream social scientists to explain the stubborn persistence of poverty and underdevelopment in Appalachia can be categorized as two types: the subculture of poverty model, and the regional development model. In response to the inadequacy of these models, and the social policy that followed from them, radical intellectuals and activists developed an internal colonialism model for the Central Appalachian region. In recent years substantial gains have been made in the theoretical and empirical investigation of neocolonialism, dependency, internal colonialism, advanced capitalism, and the capitalist world system. The resulting clarification of these concepts suggests that the analysis of Central Appalachia as an internal colony needs to be reconsidered and a more adequate formulation developed. My conclusion is that Central Appalachia is best characterized as a peripheral region within an advanced capitalist society. Each of the three current models was first developed in the context of underdevelopment in the Third World and later applied by analogy to the Appalachian case. I will summarize and criticize these models, suggest possible grounds for a synthesis, and argue for the alternative formulation suggested above.

The Subculture of Poverty Model

The subculture of poverty model identifies the internal deficiencies of the lower-class subculture as the cause of the problem. Oscar Lewis is the social scientist most closely identified with this model, and the most widely read exposition of the model applied to Appalachia is Jack Weller's *Yesterday's People*, which borrows an analytic framework from Herbert Gans.¹ The subculture of poverty model suggests remedial programs of education, social casework, and clinical psychology. Studies of Appalachian culture in these terms include works by psychiatrist David Loeff, social worker Norman Polansky, and sociologist Richard Ball.²

The work on Appalachia in the subculture of poverty tradition has a very limited validity at best because of three problems that the authors fail to confront: deficient research methodology, a blurring of community and social class diversity in the region, and a lack of historical perspective and specification. The methodological approach in the works of Weller, Loeff, and Polansky, for example, imports sociological or psychiatric categories and focuses on the pathological. They overgeneralize from problem families to the culture of one or more social classes. They fail to distinguish between the traditional Southern Appalachian subculture and a contemporary subculture of poverty. The limitations of these scientific, clinical classification systems are particularly evident in comparison to the work of such writers as Robert Coles, John Fetterman, Tony Dunbar, and Kathy Kahn, whose humanistic method uses their subjects' own words to characterize Appalachian life-worlds.³ Their descriptions of individuals and families manage to capture the strengths as well as the shortcomings of mountaineers and the diversity of personality types within some common subcultural themes. These accounts

of the contradictions in the lives and outlooks of mountain people bear out Helen Lewis' suggestion that many Appalachians are in fact bi-cultural; they take part in the traditional subculture in family and neighborhood life, and in the mainstream culture through employment, formal education, media entertainment, and contact with public agencies.

The subculture of poverty model in general has been subjected to devastating criticism.⁴ In the Appalachian case, sociologist Dwight Billings has shown the model to be of little value in explaining the lack of economic development in the mountain section of North Carolina and the contrasting industrialization of the piedmont, for example. Ironically, it was just when the distinctiveness of the Southern Appalachian traditional subculture was fading that the subculture of poverty model was popularized and applied to the region.⁵ For all the controversy generated in the debate over the subculture of poverty, this model had less policy impact on Appalachia than one might expect. The model did help to rationalize such national programs as Project Head Start, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, and the great expansion of social services that took place in the 1960's. But the subculture of poverty model was not a major influence on the state and federal planners who devised the Appalachian Regional Development Act of 1965.

The Regional Development Model

Although the literature on development includes disciplines from social psychology to social ecology, the most influential stream derives from neoclassical economics as amended by central place theory.⁶ The resulting regional development model is concerned with providing economic and social overhead capital, training people for skills for new industrial and service jobs, facilitating migration, and promoting the establishment or relocation of privately-owned industries through a growth center strategy. A modernizing elite is seen as the agent of the developmental process. The major attempt to apply the model within the United States is the work of the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) and its associated programs. Niles Hansen is probably the best-known academic proponent of this approach.⁷

The Appalachian regional development advocates have an academic base in the Departments of Sociology, Economics and Agricultural Economics at West Virginia University, the University of Kentucky, and the University of Tennessee, and such related applied research institutes as the Appalachian Center at WVU, the Center for Developmental Change at UK, and the Appalachian Resources Project at UT. More significantly, this model has a political base in the multi-county Local Development Districts established under the ARC program. The LLDs serve primarily as a mechanism for arriving at consensus among regional elites. Through the dual federal-state structure of the ARC, the interests of regional and national elites are reconciled.

With its emphasis on mainstream economic theory and the technical aspects of development, the regional development model lays claim to being a scientific, value-free, and non-controversial approach. As such, it is an effective means of providing additional resources to the region without affecting the existing structure of resource control. Actions taken by regional and national planners are defended as technical

decisions, rather than political choices among alternative courses of development. The most important decisions are the "non-decisions": the questions that are never raised and the subjects that never make the public agenda.⁸ Examples include public ownership of the region's natural resources and worker or community-owned and controlled industry.⁹

The Internal Colonialism Model

The issues of power and privilege in Appalachia are never faced squarely by the subculture of poverty and regional development advocates. In reaction to this obvious shortcoming, radical academics and activists looked for a model that emphasized inequality and exploitation. They hit upon the internal colonialism model for reasons that had more to do with the focus of the New Left in the late 1960's-imperialism abroad and oppression of racial minorities at home-than the appropriateness of the model to the Appalachian situation. As the Appalachian radicals apply the internal colonialism model, it has been used to examine the process by which dominant outside industrial interests established control and continue to prevent autonomous development of the subordinate internal colony. The model suggests the need for an anti-colonial movement and a radical restructuring of society with a redistribution of resources to the poor and powerless.

Dependency and Neocolonialism

The internal colonialism model has emerged from a background of the history and theories of colonialism and imperialism and is most directly related to the theories of neocolonialism and dependency that have been developed in the post-World War II period. Dependency theory has been developed primarily by radical economists and sociologists concerned with Latin America, while the theories of neocolonialism and imperialism have been more concerned with Asia and Africa, or the Third World as a whole.¹⁰

A vital contribution of the dependency model is the notion of the "infrastructure of dependency," the structures internal to the dependent country including industrial organization, patterns of urbanization, and social classes. In the exposition by Suzanne Bodenheimer, two examples of the infrastructure of dependency are the patterns of dependent industrialization and the formation of clientele social classes. Characteristics of dependent industrialization include foreign domination of the most dynamic sectors of industry, increasing competitive advantage for foreign monopolistic enterprises over local firms, and the introduction of advanced, capital-intensive technology without regard to resulting unemployment. Clientele classes have a "dual position as partners of metropolitan interests, yet dominant elites within their own societies." They may include not only the industrial bourgeoisie but also the state bureaucracy and other sectors of the middle class when their positions are tied to foreign interests. The infrastructure of dependency is thus "the functional equivalent of a formal colonial apparatus," but insofar as it is internalized and institutionalized "much more difficult to overcome."¹¹

Internal Colonialism

The success of the anticolonial movements in the Third World following World War II has undoubtedly contributed to the popularity of referring to a variety of exploitative situations within both developing and advanced industrial countries as internal or domestic colonialism. Through conceptual confusion or carelessness, internal colonialism has been used to designate situations of stratification by class, race, ethnicity, or geography, alone or in various combinations. It is also used to describe absentee industrial ownership, although this is a characteristic feature of uneven and polarized capitalist development.¹² Included among such internal colonies have been the U.S. South; northern New England, the northern Great Lakes region, the Southwest, the "Celtic periphery" of England, southern Italy and so on.¹³ One explanation may be that the vocabulary of colonization is more comfortable than that of class conflict, and regional or ethnic chauvinism is more acceptable than talk of socialism.

Internal colonialism is a useful concept if defined in a rigorous sense rather than used as an all-inclusive catchword. Two precise definitions with varying degrees of restrictiveness are advanced by Pablo Gonzalez-Casanova and Pierre van den Berghe. Gonzalez-Casanova seeks to distinguish internal colonialism from a class structure with a geographic or racial aspect:

"Internal colonialism corresponds to a structure of social relations based on domination and exploitation among culturally heterogeneous, distinct groupsIt is the result of an encounter between two races, cultures, or civilizations, whose genesis and evolution occurred without any mutual contact up to one specific moment The colonial structure and internal colonialism are distinguished from the class structure since colonialism is not only a relation of exploitation of the workers by the owners of raw materials or of production and their collaborators, but also a relation of domination and exploitation of a total population (with its distinct classes, proprietors, workers) by another population which also has distinct classes (proprietors and workers)."¹⁴

In short, the Gonzalez-Casanova definition requires a dual class structure: two class systems, one dominant and the other subordinate, each of which may be differentiated to a greater or lesser degree. This appears to be a useful minimal definition of internal colonialism, although it is broad enough to include a variety of dominant-subordinate group relationships.

The most restrictive definition of internal colonialism is developed by van den Berghe in a recent work. His view, in part a reaction to the overly broad use of the term, is worth quoting at length:

"In my opinion, the concept of internal colonialism, when so diluted, loses all of its use for purposes of social science analysis. I shall therefore propose to treat internal colonialism as an ideal type with the following characteristics:

- 1) Rule of one ethnic group (or coalition of such groups) over other such groups living within the continuous boundaries of a single state.
- 2) Territorial separation of the subordinate ethnic groups into "homelands," "native reserves," and the like, with land tenure rights distinct from those applicable to members of the dominant group.

- 3) Presence of an internal government within a government especially created to rule the subject peoples, with a special legal status ascribed to the subordinate groups . . .
- 4) Relations of economic inequality in which subject peoples are relegated to positions of dependency and inferiority in the division of labor and the relations of production.

“Such a definition of internal colonialism excludes mere regional differences in economic development, mere class differences in the system of production, and, a fortiori, differences based on age, sex, slave status, caste, sexual behavior (e.g., homosexuality), physical handicaps, and countless others. The usefulness of the concept to understand the situation of a group is a function of that group's approximation to the characteristics of the ideal type. For instance, in the United States, internal colonialism describes the position of Amerindians quite well, of Chicanos somewhat, of blacks poorly, of Appalachian whites hardly at all, and of women, old people, homosexuals and convicts only by the most fanciful stretch of the academic imagination. This is not to say that some of the groups excluded from my definition of internal colonialism may not be as badly or worse off than the denizens of the internal colonies. Their position is fundamentally *different*, however, and, hence, the internal colonial model is a poor one to understand their predicament. Internal colonialism is but one of many ways of getting the short end of the stick.”¹⁵

Gonzalez-Casanova's criterion of a dual class structure appears to include points one and four of van den Berghe's ideal type. The latter would also require territorial separation and a special governing unit for full correspondence to the internal colonialism model. I find it most useful to adopt a definition between González-Casanova and van den Berghe, thus requiring economic exploitation, a dual class structure based on ethnic differences, within one or more distinct geographic regions. In other words I would place internal colonialism as a special case within the theory of dependent capitalist development.

Internal Colonialism Applied to Appalachia

I can find no use of the colonialism analogy to the Appalachians prior to the early 1960's. During the unionization battles of the 1930's, the Left press emphasized themes of exploitation and class conflict along classic Marxian lines in their articles about the Appalachian coalfields.¹⁶ Only after the internal colonial model had been applied to blacks did writers on Appalachia begin to speak in terms of colonialism. In his best selling 1962 study *Night Comes to the Cumberlands*, Harry Caudill makes only a passing reference to colonialism; by 1965 he begins to use the internal colonial designation.¹⁷ The theme was quickly picked up by activists and radical intellectuals in the Central Appalachian area, particularly the group associated with the Peoples' Appalachian Research Collective and its journal, *Peoples' Appalachia*. Helen Lewis and her associates have attempted a detailed application to Appalachia of Blauner's model of the process of internal colonization of black Americans.

I find the application of Blauner's model of internal colonialism, broad as it is, to Appalachia to be strained at some key points. The parallel to "forced, involuntary entry" by the colonizers is nowhere near as strong as the case of enslaved blacks from Africa or the conquered Native American tribes or the Mexican people of the Southwest. In the elaborated version of his argument, Blauner distinguishes between "colonized and immigrant minorities" and suggests that the circumstances of entry of white European ethnic immigrant groups is different in character from that of blacks and possibly other people of color in the United States. The situation of Appalachian people is clearly a third variant if they are to be treated as a minority at all; the mountaineers were an early settler group established for sixty to a hundred years before the expansion of industrial capitalism into the region. Blacks and immigrant ethnic groups have played an important role in the development of the Southern Appalachian coal industry, particularly in West Virginia, but the focus of the Appalachian internal colonialism theorists has not been on such groups.¹⁸ The deception and fraud used in Appalachia by the vanguard of land, timber, and mineral agents do not appear to differ in kind from those techniques used generally by capitalists and their agents throughout the country in the period of industrial expansion.

On the question of "administration by representatives of the dominant power," the application of Blauner's internal colonialism model to Appalachia suffers from his emphasis on "police colonialism," the direct application of force by members of the dominant group. Blauner has not put enough emphasis on the neocolonial mechanism of an indigenous stratum of officials ruling in the interests of the dominant group. Helen Lewis suggests that the study of such local elite groups in the mountains is of great importance.¹⁹ but this conclusion and suggestions of what mechanisms to look for flow more readily from the more general dependency model than from the narrower internal colonialism model.

The parallel to "racism as a principle of social domination" really breaks down in the Appalachian case. There may be prejudice against "hillbillies," but it is essentially based on bias against the lower classes, not all the people of the region.²⁰ There is no parallel to the dual class structures required by González-Casanova's definition of internal colonialism. Mountaineers are able to "pass" into mainstream America both through migration and, for some, through integration into the business elite in the mountains.²¹ White Appalachians generally have a potential for social mobility not matched by racial minorities. The traditional Appalachian subculture may be becoming a museum piece, but this is a situation far from white Appalachians as a group being accorded the near-caste position of some racial minorities in the United States.

Applying an additional characteristic of internal colonialism from van den Berghe's definition, I can find no evidence of "an Internal government within a government especially created to rule the subject peoples." The Appalachian Regional Commission is not a functional counterpart of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The people of Appalachia have no distinct legal status distinguishing them from other residents of the United States, as Native Americans do in some instances. Appalachia appears to provide a very poor fit to any strict definition of internal colonialism.

Cultural Hegemony and Capitalist Domination

Much of the attraction of the internal colonialism model including its application to Appalachia, derives from its powerful analysis of the destruction of indigenous culture in the process of establishing and maintaining domination over the colonized group. Religion and education can play a major role in the destruction of traditional culture. The missionary movement in Appalachia can be seen as aiding, often inadvertently, the process of domination, as Lewis, Kobak and Johnson have described. James Branscome and Mike Clark have brought this analysis up to date by examining the effect of schooling on Appalachian culture in the current period.

These arguments hit the mark, but is cultural domination a distinctive feature of internal colonialism rather than class exploitation? A common and understandable misconception, derived in part from the stress on economic determinism in vulgar Marxist analysis, is that culture plays an insignificant part in the structure of class domination under capitalism. The colonial model is seen as distinctive by Blauner for its emphasis on this ignored area: "... the colonial attack on culture is more than a matter of economic factors such as labor recruitment and special exploitation. The colonial situation differs from the class situation of capitalism precisely in the importance of culture as an instrument of domination."²² Orthodox Marxism has been particularly weak in its analysis of culture, and Blauner misses the importance of ideological hegemony in the establishment and maintenance of capitalist domination. For the beginnings of an adequate theory of the role of culture in capitalist societies we must turn to the Western Marxist tradition and such writers as Georg Lukacs, Antonio Gramsci, and the Frankfurt School theorists. The concept of cultural hegemony derives from Gramsci and emphasizes the obtaining of consent rather than the use of force in the perpetuation of class structures. Gwynn Williams provides a useful summary of Gramsci's notion of hegemony: "an order in which a certain way of life and thought is dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused throughout society in all its institutional and private manifestations, informing with its spirit all taste, morality, customs, religious and political principles, and all social relations, particularly in their intellectual and moral connotation."²³ The destruction of indigenous culture may be more conspicuous in the colonial situation, but a comparable process works to erode all ethnic and working-class cultures in advanced capitalist countries, a process which has perhaps advanced furthest in the United States.²⁴

A few radical economists have attempted to avoid the problems of the colonialism analogy by returning to a traditional Marxian analysis of Appalachia in the context of capitalist exploitation and have suggested the fruitfulness of a longitudinal study of the removal of surplus value from the region over time. But this focus on economic relationships loses the valuable emphasis of the internal colonialism model on the role of cultural domination and the contribution of the dependency formulation on the "infrastructures of dependency." Perhaps the best formulation of a research project from the perspective of radical economics has been made by Richard Simon, who reviews the historical development of the West Virginia economy in the context of dependency theory, suggesting relationships with the social and political structures of that state and with the introduction of federal government programs in the 1960's.²⁵ It is time to

synthesize the best of the models so far put forward and develop a more accurate and comprehensive theory of poverty and underdevelopment in Central Appalachia.

Appalachia within an Advanced Capitalist Society

It is tempting to characterize the subculture of poverty, regional development, and internal colonialism models as, respectively, conservative, liberal, and radical models of barriers to social change. While this would contain a substantial amount of truth, the description would be misleading in one respect. From a perspective that I will develop briefly here, the three models are not, strictly speaking, mutually exclusive alternatives. Interpreted in terms of a framework developed by Jürgen Habermas, they represent different dimensions of social existence.

A Framework for Synthesis

For Habermas, there are three fundamental conditions or media through which social systems are maintained: interaction, work, and power or domination. All human societies use these means to resolve the problems of preserving life and culture. Corresponding to each of these media are the human "interests" in mutual understanding, technical control, and "emancipation from seemingly 'natural' constraint."²⁶ A solution to the problems of Appalachian poverty and underdevelopment would have to be concerned with each of the three modes of culture, technique, and domination. Habermas' distinction provides a basis for viewing cultural adaptation, technical development, and redistribution of power as potentially complementary aspects of social development. Our models, therefore, are not merely three selected from a long list of possible models of poverty and underdevelopment. They represent fundamental dimensions of social life and may well be exhaustive of the possible alternatives if stated in a sufficiently general form (which none of the three current models are).

The subculture of poverty model can thus be seen as only one part of a broader framework of explanations rooted in the tradition of cultural idealism. Affirmative cultural approaches toward Southern Appalachia, exemplified by William G. Frost and John C. and Olive D. Campbell, are the obverse side of the coin from the pejorative tradition. Although they come to opposite conclusions about the virtue of the traditional mountain subculture, they are contending on the same turf. The regional development model, from this synthetic perspective, is seen as resting within the contemporary technocratic image and ideology of science. As John Friedmann points out, the regionalism movement of the 1930's, as personified by Howard Odum and others, was rooted in cultural idealism. The new regionalism of the 1960's, embodied in the ARC, discarded this grounding in favor of the technical reason of neoclassical economic theory.²⁷ The internal colonialism model is, similarly, one component of a broad range of theories that contribute to a critique of power and domination.

This synthetic view helps explain why writers widely considered to be champions of a certain model of Appalachian underdevelopment also draw on other models. Caudill, for

example, is best known for his description of the Cumberland Plateau as an example of colonialism, but in *Night Comes to the Cumberlands* he also paints a pejorative picture of the subculture of the eastern Kentucky poor. In one essay Caudill appears to embrace many aspects of the developmental model, while in his most recent work he has re-emphasized a genetic explanation. From the other side, Weller is best known for his subculture of poverty characterization in *Yesterday's People*, yet he has recently described Appalachia as "America's mineral colony."²⁸ Such examples can be viewed as cases of inconsistency, confusion, or conversion. They can also be seen, at least in part, as attempts to grapple with the complexity of analyzing the problem of Appalachian development. To suggest that a dialectic of mutual interaction takes place among the modes of culture, technique, and power is, of course, not to argue that each of our three models of Appalachian underdevelopment is to be taken with equal seriousness.

I have suggested that the history of the Appalachian region is best understood in the context of industrial capitalist development. The internal colonialism model raises important questions about wealth, power, and domination without offering a satisfactory characterization of the situation of Central Appalachia. My synthesis of the three models leads to the conclusion that Appalachian poverty and underdevelopment need to be placed within a broader critique of domination. From this perspective, Central Appalachia must be analyzed in the context of advanced capitalism in the United States. In some instances (analyzing the role of the Japanese steel industry in providing capital for opening new coal mines in the region, for example), we may have to expand our horizon to the framework of the world capitalist system.

In a recent work Habermas formulates a model of advanced capitalism, which he characterizes by two features: the "process of economic concentration"-the growth of national and multinational corporations-and the "supplementation and partial replacement of the market mechanism by state intervention."²⁹ Habermas goes on to analyze advanced capitalist societies in terms of their economic, administrative (state), and legitimation systems and the resulting class structures. Applying a similar analysis will contribute to a deeper understanding of the position of Central Appalachia.

The Economy

There is growing agreement among economists critical of neoclassical theory that a three-sector model is necessary to characterize the advanced capitalist economy in the United States. John Kenneth Galbraith delineates the market system, the planning system, and the state. As a rough demarcation, Galbraith's planning system consists of the largest "one thousand manufacturing, merchandising, transportation, power and financial corporations producing approximately half of all the goods and services not provided by the state." Making up the market system are the remaining twelve million firms which produce the other half of the non-state output of goods and services.³⁰ The market system includes farmers, small retail and service establishments, construction and small manufacturing firms, and the arts. Whereas the workings of the market system bear some resemblance to the model of competition embodied in classical economics, the planning system is oligopolistic and its stability depends on the intervention of the state.

James O'Connor has developed a similar model with a much deeper analysis of governmental activity. O'Connor also divides private capital into two sectors: a competitive sector (roughly parallel to Galbraith's market system) and a monopoly sector (somewhat smaller than Galbraith's planning system). O'Connor's state sector includes two categories: "production of goods and services organized by the state itself and production organized by industries under contract with the state."³¹ Approximately one-third of the labor force in the United States is employed in each of these three sectors. The monopoly and state-contract sectors tend to be capital-intensive industries, while the competitive and state service sectors tend to be labor intensive. As a consequence, wages tend to be high in the monopoly and state sectors and low in the competitive sector. Unions tend to be strong in the monopoly and state sectors and weak in the competitive sector. Both product and labor markets tend to be unstable and irregular in the competitive sector, a circumstance which has fostered the development of segmented labor markets.³²

State sector expenditures, in O'Connor's model, are divided into two categories, social capital and social expenses, with social capital being of two kinds, social investment and social consumption. This distinction between social investment and social consumption roughly parallels Niles Hansen's distinction between economic and social overhead capital. Social investment, in O'Connor's terms, "consists of projects and services that increase the productivity of a given amount of labor-power and, other factors being equal, increase the rate of profit." Examples include government-subsidized roads, railroads, and industrial parks. Social consumption "consists of projects and services that lower the reproduction costs of labor and, other factors being equal, increase the rate of profit." Social consumption expenditures fall into two categories: goods and services consumed collectively and social insurance. Examples of the first include school, recreation and medical facilities, and the second, Social Security, workman's compensation, unemployment insurance, and health insurance. Most of the programs developed through the Appalachian Regional Commission are thus in the areas of social investment and the first, or collective, category of social consumption. Finally, social expenditures "consist of projects and services which are required to maintain social harmony-to fulfill the state's 'legitimization' function. They are not even indirectly productive." O'Connor includes welfare and military programs in this category.³³

This model of the advanced capitalist economy in the United States has some obvious implications for an analysis of the Central Appalachian region, particularly in regard to the coal industry. The coal industry is unusual, though not unique, in having both substantial monopolistic and competitive sectors. Manufacturing and mining industries are generally concentrated in the monopolistic sector, while the competitive sector is primarily composed of small factories and services. The coal industry thus offers an opportunity for a comparative study of these two sectors within a single industry. Topics for investigation include relative rates between the two sectors of capital investment, wage levels, productivity, technological innovation, unionization, and influence on the legislative, administrative, and judicial institutions of the state that affect the coal

industry. Contrasting business ideologies between the two sectors need to be explored. Since Central Appalachia contains the largest concentration of firms in the competitive sector of the coal industry, it is a particularly appropriate location for a study of the two sectors.

The Role of the State

The institutions that compose the state, to take Ralph Miliband's definition, are the executive, the legislative, the administrative (civil service bureaucracy), the military and police, the judiciary, and the subcentral governmental units. This system is part of a broader political system, which includes political parties, pressure groups, and a variety of other institutions not defined as political, such as corporations, churches, and mass media. A crucial question is the relationship between the state (and state elite) and the dominant economic class. Miliband recalls that "it is obviously true that the capitalist class, as a class, does not actually 'govern.' One must go back to isolated instances of the early history of capitalism, such as the commercial patriciates of cities like Venice and Lubeck, to discover direct and sovereign rule by businessmen."³⁴

Contemporary analysts of the role of the state in advanced capitalism, including Miliband, O'Connor, and Nicos Poulantzas,³⁵ emphasize the relative autonomy of the state system. From their viewpoint, the familiar statement of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels that "the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie" has been vulgarized. As Miliband comments, "The notion of common affairs assumes the existence of particular ones; and the notion of the whole bourgeoisie implies the existence of separate elements which make up that whole. This being the case, there is an obvious need for an institution of the kind they refer to, namely the state; and the state cannot meet this need without enjoying a certain degree of autonomy."³⁶ But the summary statement of Marx and Engels is still too abbreviated; the state reflects not simply the common interests of the whole bourgeoisie but a compromise between those interests and the interests of subordinate classes. The balance of the compromise depends in part on the level and extent of political struggle by the subordinate classes.

In a recent work that draws on Miliband, Poulantzas, and O'Connor, Ian Gough develops the role of state expenditures as concessions to working class struggles. The expansion of social services and social insurance since the Depression of the 1930's has meant that an increasing amount of the compensation of the labor force has come in the form of social wages. Indeed, "the strength of working-class pressure," he writes, "can roughly be gauged by the comprehensiveness and the level of the social benefits." Although such programs are tailored and modified to accommodate the interests of the dominant class, Gough notes:

"It is essential to distinguish their concrete historical origins from the ongoing function they play within that particular social formation. Social policies originally the product of class struggle will, in the absence of further struggle, be absorbed and adapted to benefit the interests of the dominant classes. On the other hand, whatever their particular function for capital at any time, the fact that social services are also an

integral part of the real wage level of the working class means that they are fought for in much the same way as money wages, in economic and political class struggle."³⁷

In a similar fashion, the class distribution of the burden of taxation also affects the real wages of the working class.

This recognition of the importance of social services, income transfer programs, and tax policy helps us understand and situate such social movements in the Central Appalachian region as the Black Lung Associations and their fights for workmen's compensation, clinical treatment programs, expanded benefits from the UMWA Health and Retirement Funds, and the severance tax on coal. It also illuminates the role of the federal bureaucracy and judicial system in the reform of the UMWA and its Health and Retirement Funds, the struggle for mine safety and health, and the expansion of a variety of benefits from social security to food stamps to community mental health services.

The Legitimation System

Habermas argues that formal democratic institutions which allow universal adult voting in elections may obtain sufficient "diffuse mass loyalty" in the absence of substantive participation in public policy formulation if two conditions are present: "civic privatism" and an ideology that justifies elite rule. Civic privatism involves a withdrawal from the public realm into "career, leisure, and consumption." Both the "theory of democratic elitism" favored by mainstream American political science and the mystique of technical expertise promoted by theorists of public administration serve to legitimate the absence of public participation in political decision making.³⁸

Among the working class in Central Appalachia, legitimation of the political system appears to be weak at the level of specific institutions yet remains strong at a diffuse level ("patriotism "). Cynicism about public officials abounds, with ample justification. The retreat to privatism is possibly facilitated by the extended family systems, which may provide sources for satisfaction even in the absence of substantial material comforts. Yet agencies of government frequently seek legitimation through a rhetoric of democratic participation. For example, TVA's claims of "grass roots democracy" disguised a policy of conceding the farm and related rural development programs to the local agricultural elites in exchange for a free hand for federal planners in public electrical power generation.³⁹ The ARC uses the Local Development Districts as the "local building blocks" of a program of federal-state cooperation. In Central Appalachia, such claims have seldom received an affirmative embrace from the working class, but they have met with acquiescence more often than active opposition.

The Class Structure

A common rhetorical excess is the description of the class structure of Central Appalachia as polarized into the wealthy and the poor. For Harry Caudill, there are "two Appalachias ... side by side and yet strangers to each other. One, the Appalachia of Power and Wealth, ... headquartered in New York and Philadelphia, is allied to mighty

banks and insurance companies The second Appalachia is a land devastatedIts people are the old, the young who are planning to leave and the legions of crippled and sick."⁴⁰ The reality, of course, is far more complicated. The question is not merely one of polemical license. Any strategy for social change must make a thorough assessment of the potential interest in change of the various class groupings in the region.

It is generally agreed that advanced capitalism has led to a proliferation of class and occupational groupings between the classic proletariat (the industrial working class) and the bourgeoisie of monopoly capital. The expansion of service industries with its accompanied increase in grey-collar and white-collar employment has been one aspect of this increase. The development of what Galbraith calls the "educational and scientific estate" is another. Despite the increased level of average per capita income, the distribution of shares of income and wealth has changed little in the past forty years. The "myth of the middle class" has been dispelled by careful analysis of confusing census occupational categories, and the continuing existence of a "working-class majority" has been established.⁴¹

In Central Appalachia, the expansion of state expenditures has helped create sizable intermediate class groupings of public workers (in education, local government, and public services) and workers in industries heavily subsidized by public funds (health services particularly). Unionization efforts have been made recently among municipal and hospital workers. These elements of the "new working-class" have taken their places alongside such long-established groups as coal miners, workers in small factories, small farmers, country merchants, county-seat retailers, bankers, professionals, independent coal operators, and managers for the nationally-based coal companies in the monopolistic sector, in addition to household workers, the welfare poor, and others outside the standard labor force. The class structure is obviously complex, and its changes need to be analyzed over time, particularly in relation to changes in the coal industry and the growth of state expenditures. Radicals must learn to paint portraits of the region in which a variety of working people can recognize themselves.

The Internal Periphery

In a market economy, certain regions within a country will experience economic rise or decline in response to such circumstances as demographic changes, technological advances, and the depletion of resources. On this the theorists of regional growth, urban hierarchies, and uneven capitalist development are agreed. As the core-periphery distinction is presently used by several schools of economic thought, it seems reasonable to me to apply the term peripheral to such regions within advanced capitalist countries as Appalachia which share many of the characteristics of underdevelopment, poverty, and dependency found in the peripheral countries of the Third World. Certainly the term is a more appropriate analogy than internal colony, which, as I have illustrated, should be restricted to a special case.

Immanuel Wallerstein has recently begun developing a more rigorous theory of the relationship of core and peripheral countries in the capitalist world economy and has

elaborated an important intermediate case, that of the semi-peripheral countries (a distinction that corresponds in part to the levels of development within the Third World countries).⁴² In Wallerstein's view, the semi-peripheral countries perform two important functions for the capitalist world system, one political and one political and economic. The political function is to avoid a sharp polarization into rich and poor countries that would foster an alliance among the poor nations. The intermediate sector develops a third set of interests based on its aim of making it into the core. The political-economic function of the semi-periphery is to provide an outlet for capital investment from core countries in low-wage industrial production.

The analogy between peripheral countries in the world system and peripheral regions within core countries obviously should not be pushed too far. As John Friedman points out, there are important differences between regions and countries, and between poor countries and poor regions in rich countries.⁴³ The most important difference is that countries have a relatively greater degree of closure in their boundaries. Through the use of tariff barriers, control over investments, and other means, countries can achieve a relative degree of insulation from the world economy. Constitutional and political limitations on the restraint of commerce prevent any state within the United States (much less multi-state regions without separate political authority) from following similar policies of restricting trade, investment, or population movements.

These qualifications noted, Wallerstein's three-tiered system may find an analogue within advanced capitalist countries. Regionalization and regionalism, the economic and ideological manifestations of peripheral status, may well join the racial, ethnic, and sexual aspects of the division of labor as functional barriers to class polarization of conflict over inequality.⁴⁴ The possibility of attaining semi-peripheral status may preclude a strong alliance of one region with another worse off. We see evidence of this in the successful move of the Northern and Southern Appalachian regions to standard semi-peripheral status within the United States while Central Appalachia remains behind. Given the general "fiscal crisis of the state," the federal government seems reluctant to commit resources to the elimination of regional inequality—the elevation to semi-peripheral status of all internal peripheral regions. The executive branch has resisted attempts of the Congress to expand the Title V regional commissions in the manner of the ARC. Peripheral regions remain functional for the system of advanced capitalism in the United States much in the way that poverty in general has positive functions.⁴⁵

Conclusion

Analogies are valuable in social analysis insofar as they summarize and illuminate certain features of the subject under investigation. In this sense the analogy between the situation of Central Appalachia and that of colonized countries has been stimulating and fruitful. It has focused attention on the acquisition of the raw materials of the region by outside corporate interests and on the exploitation of the local work force and community at large resulting from the removal of the region's natural resources for the benefit of absentee owners. But analogies, while providing insights into some aspects of reality, can obscure or distort others. A loose analogy is no substitute, in the long run,

for a precise theory that can lead to more detailed investigations. In this sense the internal colonialism model applied to Central Appalachia needs to be superseded by a model of peripheral regions within an advanced capitalist society.

The question is more than academic. At issue are the goals and strategy of a movement for social change. Writers using the internal colonialism model have been ambiguous about what solution is appropriate for Appalachian problems. Taking the term "colony" in its strongest sense, that of a suppressed nation, would prescribe an Appalachian nationalism aiming at secession and an independent nation-state. No one has proposed such a solution, although a weaker version -- a state of Appalachia -- been mentioned.⁴⁶ Nor have many seriously suggested that the region would be better off if all the coal companies were owned by the local elite of "hillbilly millionaires" -- a sort of bourgeois decolonization -- instead of the national and international energy corporations, although an exclusive focus on absentee ownership might lead to that conclusion. If the heart of the problem is defined as private ownership of the coal industry, then the possibility of public ownership, perhaps even limited to a regional basis, is suggested.⁴⁷ If the problem is defined as capitalist relations of production generally, then the alternative -- some form of socialism -- takes on a dimension that goes far beyond the nationalization or Appalachianization of the coal industry alone. It is this challenge of defining socialist goals and strategies that is presented by the model of peripheral regions within an advanced capitalist society.

NOTES

¹ Oscar Lewis, *The Children of Sanchez* (New York: Random House, 1961), pp. xxiv-xxvii, Jack E. Weller, *Yesterday's People: Life in Contemporary Appalachia* (Lexington: Univ. of Kentucky Press, 1965); and Herbert J. Gans, *The Urban Villagers: Group and Class in the Life of Italian-Americans* (New York: Free Press, 1962).

² David H. Looff, *Appalachia's Children: The Challenge of Mental Health* (Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1971); Norman A. Polansky, Robert D. Borgman, and Christine DeSaix, *Roots of Futility* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1972); Richard A. Ball, "New Premises for Planning in Appalachia," *Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare*, 2 (Fall 1974), 92101.

³ See Robert Coles, *Migrants, Sharecroppers, Mountaineers*, especially Chs. 5, 6, 9 and 12, and *The South Goes North*, Ch. 6 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972); John Fetterman, *Stinking Creek* (New York: Dutton, 1967); Tony Dunbar, *Our Land Too* (New York: Random House, 1969), Part II; Kathy Kahn, *Hillbilly Women* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1972). A good contrast of the two approaches is Mike Maloney and Ben Huelsman, "Humanism, Scientism, and Southern Mountaineers," *People's Appalachia*, 2 (July 1972), 24-27. The methodological basis of the humanistic approach is sketched in John R. Staude, "The Theoretical Foundations of Humanistic Sociology," in *Humanistic Society: To day's Challenge to Sociology*, ed. John F. Glass and John R. Staude (Pacific Palisades, CA: Goodyear, 1972), pp. 262-270.

⁴ In addition to Charles Valentine's *Culture and Poverty*, see Jack L. Roach and Orville R. Gurslin, "An Evaluation of the Concept 'Culture of Poverty,'" *Social Forces*, 45 (March 1967), 383-392; the comments on Valentine in *Current Anthropology*, 10 (April-June 1969), 181-201; and the essays in *The Culture of Poverty: A Critique*, ed. Eleanor Burke Leacock (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971).

⁵ Dwight Billings, "Culture and Poverty in Appalachia: A Theoretical Discussion and Empirical Analysis," *Social Forces*, 53 (December 1974) 315-323; and Thomas R. Ford, "The Passing of Provincialism," Ch. 21 *The Southern Appalachian Region: A Survey*, ed. Ford (Lexington: Univ. of Kentucky Press, 1962), pp. 9-34.

⁶ On regional development theory, see Harvey S. Perloff et al., *Regions, Resources, and Economic Growth* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1960); E. A. J. Johnson, *The Organization of Space in Developing Countries* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1970); and Harry W. Richardson, *Regional Growth Theory* (New York: Halstead, 1973). An Appalachian application is Mary Jean Bowman and W. Warren Haynes, *Resources and People in East Kentucky* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963). See also H. Dudley Plunkett and Mary Jean Bowman, *Elites and Change in the Kentucky Mountains* (Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1973).

⁷ On the ARC, see Donald Rothblatt, *Regional Planning: The Appalachian Experience* (Lexington, MA: Heath, 1971); and Monroe Newman, *The Political Economy of*

Appalachia (Lexington, MA: Heath, 1972). Niles M. Hansen's works include *Rural Poverty and the Urban Crisis* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1970); *Intermediate-Size Cities as Growth Centers* (New York: Praeger, 1971); an edited volume, *Growth Centers in Regional Economic Development* (New York: Free Press, 1972); and *Location Preferences, Migration and Regional Growth* (New York: Praeger, 1973).

⁸ The idea of "nondecisions" is developed in Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, *Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970), Ch. 3, pp. 39-51. See also Matthew Crenson, *The Politics of Air Pollution: A Study of Non-Decisionmaking in the Cities* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971); and Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder, *Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda Building* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1972).

⁹ For an example of an alternative approach see John G. Gurley, "Capitalist and Maoist Economic Development," in *America's Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian-American Relations* (New York: Vintage, 1971), pp. 324-356. Some proposals for a socialist regional development strategy for Appalachia are outlined by Richard Simon and Roger Lesser, "A Working Community Commonwealth," *Peoples' Appalachia*, 3 (Spring 1973), 9-15. On the community development corporation and its potential for Appalachia, see Brady J. Deaton, "CDCs: A Development Alternative for Rural America," *Growth and Change*, 6 (January 1975), 31-37.

¹⁰ See the articles in *Readings in U.S. Imperialism*, ed. K. T. Fann and Donald C. Hodges (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1971); in *Dependence and Underdevelopment*, ed. James D. Cockcroft, et al. (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1972); in *Structures of Dependency*, ed. Frank Bonilla and Robert Girling (Palo Alto: Stanford Univ. Institute for Political Studies, 1973); and in the special issue on dependency theory of *Latin American Perspectives*, 1 (Spring 1974). A good review essay is the editors' introduction to *Latin America: The Struggle with Dependency and Beyond*, ed. Ronald H. Chilcote and Joel C. Edelstein (New York: Schenkman, 1974), pp. 1-87.

¹¹ Susanne Bodenheimer [Jonas], "Dependency and Imperialism: The Roots of Latin American Underdevelopment," in *Readings in U.S. Imperialism*, ed. Fann and Hodges, pp. 62-64.

¹² Thorstein Veblen, *Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise in Recent Times* (1923; Boston: Beacon, 1967).

¹³ See, for example, Joe Persky, "The South: A Colony at Home," *Southern Exposure*, 1 (Summer/Fall 1973), 14-22; Andre Gorz, "Colonialism at Home and Abroad," and Lee Webb, "Colonialism and Underdevelopment in Vermont," both in *Liberation*, 16 (November 1971), 22-29 and 2933 respectively; Geoffrey Faux, "Colonial New England," *The New Republic* (28 November 1972), pp. 16-19; Dale L. Johnson, "On Oppressed Classes," in *Dependence and Underdevelopment*, ed. Cockcroft, et al., p. 277; and Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1975).

¹⁴ Pablo González-Casanova, "Internal Colonialism and National Development," in *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 1 (1965), 27-37; rpt. in *Latin American Radicalism*, ed. Irving Louis Horowitz, et al. (New York: Random House, 1969), quote from pp. 130-132.

¹⁵ Pierre van den Berghe, "Education, Class and Ethnicity in Southern Peru: Revolutionary Colonialism," in *Education and Colonialism: Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Philip G. Altbach and Gail P. Kelly (New York: McKay, forthcoming). Van den Berghe traces the origin of the term internal colonialism to a pamphlet by Leo Marquard, *South Africa's Colonial Policy* (Johannesburg: Institute of Race Relations, 1957).

¹⁶ See, for example, three excellent collections of articles in pamphlet form: *The West Virginia Miners Union, 1931: As Reported at the Time in "Labor Age"*; Harlan and Bell, *Kentucky, 1931-2, The National Miners Union: As Reported at the Time in the "Labor Defender"*; and *War in the Coal Fields, The Northern Fields, 1931: As Reported at the Time in the "Labor Defender" and "Labor Age"* (Huntington, WV: Appalachian Movement Press, 1972).

¹⁷ Caudill, *Night Comes to the Cumberlands* (Boston: Little Brown 1963), p. 325; "Misdeal in Appalachia," *The Atlantic Monthly* (June 1965): p. 44; see also his "Appalachia: The Dismal Land," *Dissent*, 14 (November-December 1967), 718-719.

¹⁸ See Kenneth R. Bailey, "A Judicious Mixture: Negroes and Immigrants in the West Virginia Mines, 1880-1917," *West Virginia History*, 34 (January 1973), 141-161; and Paul Nyden, *Black Coal Miners in the United States* (New York: American Institute for Marxist Studies, 1974).

¹⁹ See her review of Plunkett and Bowman, *Elites and Change*, In *Social Forces*, 53 (September 1974), 139-140.

²⁰ A classic example of such bias is Albert N. Votaw, "The Hillbillies Invade Chicago," *Harper's Magazine* (February 1958), pp. 64-67. An excellent study of the hillbilly stereotype is Clyde B. McCoy, "Stereotypes of Appalachians in Urban Areas: Myths, Facts, and Questions," a paper presented at the Conference on Appalachians in Urban Areas," sponsored by the Academy for Contemporary Problems, Columbus, Ohio, 28 March 1974.

²¹ Success through migration is class biased, however; see Harry K. Schwarzweller, et al., *Mountain Families in Transition* (Univ. Park: Pennsylvania Univ. Press, 1971), Chs. 6-9, pp. 121-205.

²² Robert Blauner, *Racial Oppression in America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 67; a revised version of his article "Internal Colonialism and Ghetto Revolt" appears as Ch. 2. For an application of the model to the Chicano population, see Joan Moore,

"Colonialism: The Case of the Mexican-American," *Social Problems*, 17 (Spring 1970), 463-472. Another valuable discussion is Jeffrey Prager, "White Racial Privilege and Social Change: An Examination of Theories of Racism," *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*, 17 (1972-73), 117-150. For a critical view of the model, see Donald J. Harris, "The Black Ghetto as Colony: A Theoretical Critique and Alternative Formulation," *The Review of Black Political Economy*, 2 (1972), 3-33. An interesting change of viewpoint is evident in Robert Allen, who in *Black Awakening in Capitalist America* (New York: Doubleday, 1969) made extensive use of the internal colony model; see his review "Racism and the Black Nation Thesis," *Socialist Revolution*, No. 27 (January-March 1976), pp. 145-150. Another view that emphasizes class over colony is Gilbert G. Gonzalez, "A Critique of the Internal Colony Model," *Latin American Perspectives*, 1 (Spring 1974), 154-161.

²³ Gwynn Williams, "The Concept of 'Egemonia' in the Thought of Antonio Gramsci: Some Notes on Interpretation," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 20 (October-December 1960), 587. For some of Gramsci's writings, see *The Modern Prince and Other Writings*, trans. and ed. Louis Marks (New York: International Publishers, 1957); or *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. and trans. Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971). Lukacs' classic is *History and Class Consciousness*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (1921; Boston: MIT Press, 1972). On the Frankfurt School, see Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973); and his "Some Recent Developments in Critical Theory," *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*, 18 (1973-74), 27-44.

²⁴ On the role of the schools in maintaining capitalist hegemony, see Joel H. Spring, *Education and the Rise of the Corporate State* (Boston: Beacon, 1972); Martin Carnoy, *Education as Cultural Imperialism* (New York: McKay, 1974), especially Chs. 5-8, pp. 233-370 on the United States (although I would speak of education as cultural hegemony rather than internal colonialism, as Carnoy does); and Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, *Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life* (New York: Basic Books, 1976). On the derogation of working-class culture, see Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb, *The Hidden Injuries of Class* (New York: Random House, 1972).

²⁵ See Keith Dix, "The West Virginia Economy: Notes for a Radical Base Study," *Peoples' Appalachia*, 1 (April-May 1970), 3-7; Emil Malizia, "Economic Imperialism: An Interpretation of Appalachian Underdevelopment," *Appalachian Journal*, 1 (Spring 1973), 130-137; Richard Simon, "The Development of Underdevelopment in West Virginia," an outline of a dissertation in progress dated 12 April 1973, also distributed as "Land History: Development of Underdevelopment in West Virginia," a Peoples Development Working Paper of the Regional Economic Development Commission of the Council of the Southern Mountains, Summer 1973.

²⁶ See particularly his Frankfurt inaugural address of June 1965, published as "Knowledge and Human Interests: A General Perspective," in the appendix to Jürgen

Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), pp. 301-317, quoted phrase from p. 311; and the brief explication of Habermas in the epilogue to Joachim Israel, *Alienation: From Marx to Modern Sociology* (1968; Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971), pp. 343-347. See also his essay "Technology and Science as 'Ideology,'" in *Toward a Rational Society* (Boston: Beacon, 1970), pp. 81-122; and Trent Shroyer, "Toward a Critical Theory for Advanced Industrial Society," in *Recent Sociology No.2: Patterns of Communicative Behavior*, ed. Hans Peter Dreitzel (New York: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 210-234.

²⁷ John Friedmann, "Poor Regions and Poor Nations: Perspectives on the Problem of Appalachia," *Southern Economic Journal*, 32 (April 1 966), 465-467.

²⁸ Caudill, "Jaded Old Land of Bright New Promise," in *Mountain Life & Work*, 46 (March 1970), 5-8, rpt. in *Appalachia in the Sixties*, ed. David S. Walls and John B. Stephenson (Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1972), pp. 240-246. His genetic and subculture of poverty arguments are apparent in *Night Comes to the Cumberlands*, pp. 1-31 and 273-301, but are strongly emphasized in his latest work, *A Darkness at Dawn: Appalachian Kentucky and the Future* (Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1976). Jack Weller, "Appalachia: America's Mineral Colony," in *Vantage Point*, No. 2 (1973), a now discontinued tabloid issued by the Commission on Religion in Appalachia in Knoxville.

²⁹ Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (1973; Boston: Beacon, 1975), pp. 33-41; quote from p. 33.

³⁰ Galbraith, *Economics and the Public Purpose* (1973; New York: Signet, 1975), pp. 42-43; quote from p. 42.

³¹ James O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (New York: St. Martin's, 1973), especially Ch. 1, "An Anatomy of American State Capitalism," pp. 13-39; quote from p. 17.

³² See *Labor Market Segmentation*, ed. Richard C. Edwards, et al. (Lexington, MA: Heath, 1975).

³³ O'Connor, *Fiscal Crisis of the State*, pp. 6-7, and Chs. 4-6, pp. 97-169.

³⁴ Ralph Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society: The Analysis of the Western System of Power* (London: Quartet, 1973), Ch. 3, "The State System and the State Elite," pp. 46-62; quote from p. 61.

³⁵ Nicos Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, trans. Timothy O'Hagan (1968; London: New Left Books, 1973). Poulantzas draw sheavily on the neo-orthodox structural Marxism of Louis Althusser. For the dispute between Poulantzas and Miliband, see Miliband, "Poulantzas and the Capitalist State," *New Left Review*, No. 82 (November-December 1973), pp. 83-92; and Poulantzas, "The Capitalist State: A Reply

to Miliband and Laclau," *New Left Review*, No. 95 (January-February 1976), pp. 63-83. See also Poulantzas, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism* (London: New Left Books, 1975).

³⁶ Miliband, "Poulantzas and the Capitalist State," p. 85n; the statement by Marx and Engels is from *The Manifesto of the Communist Party*, Part I.

³⁷ Ian Gough, "State Expenditure in Advanced Capitalism," *New Left Review*, No. 92 (July-August 1975), pp. 53-92, quotes from pp. 75, 76.

³⁸ Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, pp. 36-37; and his "The Scientization of Politics and Public Opinion," in *Toward a Rational Society*, pp. 6280. See also Peter Bachrach, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967).

³⁹ Philip Selznick, *TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organization* (1949; New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966).

⁴⁰ Caudill, "O, Appalachia!" *Intellectual Digest* (April 1973); rpt. in *Voices from the Hills*, ed. Robert J. Higgs and Ambrose N. Manning (New York: Ungar, 1975), pp. 524-525. See a similar collapsing of a complex stratification system to a dichotomy in Roman B. Aquizap and Ernest A. Vargas, "Technology, Power, and Socialization in Appalachia," *Social Casework*, 51 (March 1970), 131-139.

⁴¹ See Richard Parker, *The Myth of the Middle Class: Notes on Affluence and Equality* (1972; New York: Harper Colophon, 1974), for a division into poor, lower middle, upper middle and rich classes; Parker waffles and helps perpetuate the myth he attacks by not terming his "lower middle class" the working class. A more thorough analysis is done by Andrew Levison, *The Working Class Majority* (1974; New York: Penguin, 1975). A good collection of articles is *The Worker in "Post-Industrial" Capitalism: Liberal and Radical Responses*, ed. Bertram Silverman and Murray Yanowitch (New York: Free Press, 1974). For a thoughtful exploration from an orthodox Marxist perspective, see Judah Hill, *Class Analysis: United States in the 1970s* (Emeryville, CA: privately printed, 1975). An excellent analysis is presented in Erik Olin Wright, "Class Boundaries in Advanced Capitalist Societies," *New Left Review*, No. 98 (July-August 1976), pp. 3-41; also available as reprint 219 from the Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin at Madison.

⁴² Immanuel Wallerstein, "Dependence in an Interdependent World: The Limited Possibilities of Transformation within the Capitalist World Economy," *African Studies Review*, 17 (April 1974), 1-26.

⁴³ Friedmann, "Poor Regions and Poor Nations," pp. 467-470.

⁴⁴ For a view of race, ethnicity and other such status-groups as "blurred collective representations of classes" in the world system, see Wallerstein, "Social Conflict in

Post-Independence Black Africa: The Concepts of Race and Status-Group Reconsidered," in *Racial Tensions and National Identity*, ed. Ernest Q. Campbell (Nashville: Vanderbilt Univ. Press, 1972), pp. 207-226; see also his "Class-Formation in the Capitalist World-Economy," *Politics and Society*, 6 (1975), 367-375; and "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 16 (September 1974), 387-415.

⁴⁵ Herbert J. Gans, "The Positive Functions of Poverty," *The American Journal of Sociology*, 78 (September 1972), 275-289. On the Title V Commissions, see Ch. 5 in Martha Derthick, *Between State and Nation: Regional Organizations of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974), pp. 108-133.

⁴⁶ The first proposal for something resembling a special legislature for the Southern Appalachians is made by George S. Mitchell, "Let's Unite the Pie!" *Mountain Life & Work*, 27 (Spring 1951), 19-20; he suggests an "annual representative meeting and a permanent staff. ... Such a representative body ought to be ... an annual assembly of all the mountain members of the state legislatures. Possibly the Members of Congress from the Mountains might be a sort of Upper House." Dwight Macdonald proposes a state of Appalachia in "The Constitution of the United States Needs to be Fixed," *Esquire*, 70 (October 1968), 246; but it would be formed by lumping together the present states of West Virginia, Kentucky and Tennessee as part of an overall consolidation of states for the purpose of obtaining larger administrative jurisdictions. The proposal has no relation to a policy of overcoming the exploitation of the mountain region. Nor does the reorganization scheme of geographer G. Etzel Percy, which would form a state of Appalachia more appropriately from sections of southern West Virginia, southwestern Virginia, eastern Kentucky, and southeastern Ohio; see the article by Lee Harris from *The Los Angeles Times* rpt. as "A Plan to Reshape, Rename and Reduce U.S. States to 38," *The Courier-Journal & Times* (Louisville), 2 September 1973, p. E5.

⁴⁷ Gordon K. Ebersole brought the idea of the Public Utility Districts from the Northwest to the Appalachians; see his "Appalachia: Potential .. With a View," *Mountain Life & Work*, 42 (Winter 1966), ID-12. Harry Caudill picked up the idea and gave it wide publicity; see his "A New Plan for a Southern Mountain Authority," *Appalachian Review*, 1 (Summer 1966), 6-11. Ebersole and Caudill were key leaders in the Congress for Appalachian Development. An issue of *The Appalachian South*, 2 (Spring and Summer 1967) is largely devoted to articles on CAD. On the history of CAD, see David Whisnant, "The Congress for Appalachian Development," *Peoples' Appalachia*, 3 (Spring 1973), 16-22; and see Whisnant, Ch. 8, "Power for the People: The Congress for Appalachian Development," in his *Modernizing the Mountaineer* (New York: Burt Franklin & Co., 1980).